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Xenophilia or Xenophobia in U.S.
Courts? Before and After 9/11
Kevin M. Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg*
This article revisits the controversy regarding how foreigners fare in U.S.
courts. The available data, if taken in a sufficiently big sample from numerous case categories and a range of years, indicate that foreigners have fared
better in the federal courts than their domestic counterparts have fared.
Thus, the data offer no support for the existence of xenophobic bias in U.S.
courts. Nor do they establish xenophilia, of course. What the data do show
is that case selection drives the outcomes for foreigners. Foreigners’ aversion to U.S. forums can elevate the foreigners’ success rates, when measured
as a percentage of judgments rendered. Yet that aversion waxes and wanes
over the years, having generally declined in the last 20 years but with an
uptick subsequent to 9/11. Accordingly, that aversion has caused the foreigners’ “advantage” to follow the same track.

I. Introduction
How do foreigners fare in U.S. courts? This obviously important question
influences both law’s content, such as the appropriate extent of federal
jurisdiction, and litigation decisions, such as whether a foreigner should risk
litigating in the United States—to say nothing of affecting the country’s
image and economic well-being or, for that matter, of coloring justice.
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Consortium for Political and Social Research. Neither the Center nor the Consortium bears any
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Throughout our country’s history, the answer to the question has been
just as obvious to many bien-pensants. As James Madison said of state courts:
“We well know, sir, that foreigners cannot get justice done them in these
courts . . . .”1 And commentary down to the present day deploys the assumption that foreign litigants arrive here at a disadvantage, even in federal
courts.2 No one can contest the important fact that, from the country’s
origin3 to the present,4 people have believed that xenophobic bias exists. But
are they right: Do foreign litigants suffer from such bias in reality?
Some substantive and procedural law and lots of practical considerations do disadvantage foreigners.5 It accordingly may seem reasonable to
conclude that in court some nonlegal bias against them exists, too, and that
it affects outcomes. Still, no one has offered empirical proof of such bias. In
fact, evidence to date suggests that xenophobic bias is far from rampant in
U.S. courts.

II. Prior Research
A. Xenophilia Article
The first empirical foray into this realm was our own 1996 article.6 It showed
that, for cases the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts coded as terminated during fiscal years 1987–1994 in the federal district courts,7 foreigners

1

3 Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions, on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution 583 (Philadelphia, Lippincott 2d ed. 1876).

2

E.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Foundations and Modern Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 Yale J. Int’l L. 1 (1996).

3

See Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809) (Marshall, C.J.) (arguing
need for federal jurisdiction to assuage “possible fears and apprehensions” of foreign suitors).

4

See Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresident
Alien Defendants, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1, 45–47 (2006).

5

See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (2006) (“An alien may be sued in any [judicial] district.”).

6

Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 Harv. L. Rev.
1120 (1996).

7

On the situation in state courts, see id. at 1122 n.10.
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won substantially more than domestic litigants, whether they appeared as
plaintiff or defendant. We termed the foreigners’ greater success as the
“foreigner effect.”
More specifically, in the 92,142 federal actions within diversity and
alienage jurisdiction, we compared the plaintiff win rate across the three
types of actions: domestic plaintiff versus domestic defendant, foreign plaintiff versus domestic defendant, and domestic plaintiff versus foreign defendant. For judgment by any procedural means in wholly domestic cases, the
plaintiff win rate was 64 percent. Foreign plaintiffs, however, won 80 percent
of the time. Finally, when domestic plaintiffs went against foreign defendants, the plaintiff win rate dropped to 50 percent. Thus, in a way that was
significant statistically, domestic plaintiffs fared worse than foreign plaintiffs,
while domestic defendants fared worse than foreign defendants.
Before drawing any conclusion, we exhaustively explored all the available variables and reported the results. The foreigner effect was not specific
to certain case categories,8 and did not depend on the procedural route
taken to judgment,9 but instead prevailed across the board. Accordingly, the
foreigner effect survived multiple regression—which controlled not only for
termination year, but also for case category, how the case came into federal
court, judicial circuit, whether the domestic party was a corporation or
individual and whether its state citizenship was in state or out of state,
amount demanded, procedural progress, and disposition method.10 Indeed,
our reported regressions allowed us to calculate the approximate change in
the chance of winning attributable to a party’s foreign status, all else held
constant: compared to a wholly domestic case with a 50 percent chance of
the plaintiff’s winning, an apparently identical case brought by a foreign
plaintiff would enjoy a 61 percent chance, while substituting instead a
foreign defendant for the domestic defendant would drop the 50 percent
chance of the domestic plaintiff winning to 41 percent.
From these results, we, of course, did not conclude that xenophilia
prevails within the U.S. courts. Instead, we embraced a case-selection explanation. “We believe that the most plausible and powerful explanation for the
foreigner effect is that foreigners are reluctant to litigate in America for a

8

Id. at 1125–28.

9

Id. at 1136–39.

10

Id. at 1129–32.
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variety of reasons, including the apprehension that American courts exhibit
xenophobic bias and the pecuniary and nonpecuniary distastes for litigating
in a distant place.”11 The foreigners’ fear of U.S. litigation makes them
selective in choosing strong cases to pursue to judgment. “Foreigners
abandon or satisfy most claims and, presumably, persist in the cases that they
are most likely to win. Thus, cases involving a foreign litigant, as plaintiff or
defendant, are usually cases in which the foreigner has the stronger hand.”12
When the foreigners in actuality encounter less than the expected bias, they
see elevated rates of success, whether as plaintiff or defendant.
No competing explanation survived. On the one hand, we argued
that the data on close examination did not comport with other possible
explanations, such as that foreign litigants and their lawyers were substantially more capable litigants.13 On the other hand, we found circumstantial
support for our explanation in a variety of observations based on the data:
the systematic differences between domestic and international judgments
in the percentages of the caseload terminated at the various procedural
stages14 and by the various disposition methods,15 as well as their mix of
jury and judge cases16 and their differences in case size.17 When we broadened the study to include nonjudgment terminations, and thus more
settlements, we found further support in an observation that foreign plaintiffs had to go to judgment more often than domestic plaintiffs while
foreign defendants obtained more dismissals than domestic defendants.18
Finally, we noticed an analogous effect—an elevated success rate due
to the party’s aversion to the forum—by comparing for wholly domestic

11

Id. at 1133 (footnotes omitted).

12

Id. at 1133–34 (footnote omitted).

13

Id. at 1132–33.

14

Id. at 1136–37.

15

Id. at 1137–38.

16

Id. at 1138–39.

17

Id. at 1140–42.

18

Id. at 1139–40.
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diversity cases the in-state plaintiffs’ win rate to the significantly higher win
rate of out-of-state plaintiffs.19
In sum, the data from fiscal years 1987–1994 showed a strong caseselection-induced effect of foreigners’ litigation success. But we never said or
implied that anti-foreign bias is nonexistent. “The parties’ strategic behavior,
based on their expectations, could be masking the bias and offsetting its
influence to such a degree that an opposite foreigner effect appears in case
outcomes. But any xenophobic bias that does exist in American courts is
perhaps less serious than commonly thought.”20
B. Xenophobia Article
The next step in this realm’s empirical exploration was the piece published
by Kimberly Moore, then a professor and now a judge.21 Her study looked
only at patent cases in U.S. federal courts. She found that foreigners
acquired U.S. patents at a much brisker pace than they chose to enforce
them in U.S. courts. She therefore acknowledged that the comparatively low
rate of enforcement by foreign patentees supports our theory that foreign
aversion to litigating here creates a strong selection effect.
However, she contended that her data indicated we were wrong
about the bottom line. “The data in this study [by Moore] substantiate the
existence of xenophobic bias in the American courts with American juries
in patent suits. Clermont and Eisenberg find that American parties win
37% of all cases in which their adversaries are foreign, while this study
finds that American parties win 64% of such cases in the patent context.”22
Careful reading of her article shows her to rely essentially on that 64
percent datum. So, how to explain its stark difference with our quoted
result?23 Well, basically, the difference is not so stark, as we can demonstrate in three simple steps.

19

Id. at 1142–43.

20

Id. at 1132.

21

Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1497 (2003).

22

Id. at 1520.

23
Professor Moore’s favored explanation was that our data from the Administrative Office were
inaccurate. She reported that “in a large percentage of the patent cases the Administrative
Office (AO) reported the judgment incorrectly” as being for plaintiff or defendant. Id. at 1523.
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1. (a) To reconcile our results, we first note that she worked with
a different set of cases. She used an original database that she
developed by examination of court files in federal cases that the
Administrative Office had identified as patent cases. Her database
comprised 4,247 patent infringement cases terminated by judgment
during (seemingly fiscal years) 1999–2000. Her results are difficult
to replicate without access to her data. (b) Next, we note that
although she had acquired information on judgments produced by
all types of procedural devices, she reported results for only the 5
percent of those judgments that had gone through trial.24 (c) We
finally note that she emphasized results only for jury trials. The

She promised, id. at 1507 n.34, 1522 n.86, 1523 n.90, to expand on this point in an upcoming
article to be entitled “Empirical Studies: Fact or Fiction.”
In an earlier draft of her xenophobia article, she put that AO error rate, as to who had won,
at a striking 71 percent. Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts: An Empirical
Study of Patent Litigation 35 (Apr. 2, 2002) (manuscript, on file with authors). She changed the
stark number into the adjective “large” in the published version, perhaps in response to our
email pointing out that even random entries by clerks around the country would produce about
a 50 percent error rate, so “a 71% error rate on judgment would have to be wilful, which would
make your upcoming AO article a blockbuster. Moreover, there is a ton of field work that
confirms the general thrust of the AO data at least for adjudicated cases.” Email from Kevin M.
Clermont to Kimberly A. Moore (Sept. 2, 2002) (on file with authors).
The important point is that last one. Despite minor gaps and misclassifications, the relevant
variables in the AO data, in the aggregate, appear to be reliable. See Kevin M. Clermont &
Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win
Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 581, 585 & n.10 (1998); Theodore Eisenberg
& Margo Schlanger, The Reliability of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Database: An
Initial Empirical Analysis, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1455, 1470 (2003) (showing the comparable
error rate for tort cases to be under 5 percent—and that the error rate drops under 2 percent
if one omits the mysteriously coded but relatively rare “judgment for both” plaintiff and
defendant, as we did in our xenophilia article).
24
The tried cases comprised 119 bench trials (28 involving foreign and domestic sides) and 104
jury trials (36 involving foreign and domestic sides). See Moore, supra note 21, at 1512–13; cf.
id. at 1513–14 (verifying her jury trial result with an expanded data set from 1990–2000). At two
points, she mentioned results of granted summary judgments, id. at 1509–10, 1543 n.150, which
are more numerous than trials, see id. at 1512 n.53. But her results are difficult to reconcile: she
reported that foreigners prevailed in 43 percent of summary judgments, in 54 percent of bench
trials, and in 56 percent of the judgments by those two methods combined. It is unclear how
combining the methods could produce a higher win rate than either of the methods produced
separately.
However, it is clear that her results for trial do not prevail more generally in patent cases. See,
e.g., Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 22
& n.38 (2006) (finding that nationality has no statistically significant effect on patent cases
finally disposed of by the Federal Circuit).
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Jury and Judge Trials in 12 Case Categories During FY 1987–1994
Foreign Plaintiffs

All-Domestic Cases

Foreign Defendants

61.10
72.25
401
418

50.63
61.32
9,337
3,653

50.00
54.60
1,664
641

Jury plaintiff win rate
Judge plaintiff win rate
Number of jury trials
Number of judge trials

Note: This table shows that foreigners, over a short period, outperformed their domestic
counterparts in both jury trials and judge trials. It gives the plaintiff win rate and the number of
fully tried cases in 12 case categories that offer litigants a clear choice between jury and judge:
Negotiable Instruments; General Contract; Torts to Land; Airplane Personal Injury; Assault,
Libel & Slander; Marine Personal Injury; Motor Vehicle Personal Injury; Other Personal Injury;
Medical Malpractice; Product Liability; General Fraud; and Torts to Personal Property.
Source: Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 Harv.
L. Rev. 1120, 1139 (1996) (using Administrative Office data for fiscal years 1987–1994).

reason for this narrow focus on the docked tail of the elephant
appears to have been an earlier acquired distaste for jury trials in
patent cases.25 She found that domestic parties won 64 percent of
jury trials against foreigners, but only 46 percent of bench trials. She
theorized that judges perform better because of “a combination of
less prejudice and greater predictability by judges.”26 That is, juries
were at fault. (d) Given her narrow focus, Professor Moore might
have phrased her summary in the following way: “Clermont and Eisenberg find that American parties win 37% of all [alienage judgments], while
this study finds that American parties win 64% of [patent jury trials in
which their adversaries are foreign].”
2. Unfortunately, that improved summary still compares apples to
oranges, albeit better-described apples and oranges. Given her
focus, the most appropriate comparison with our data would have
been with our jury trial result. In that corner of our article, our
reported results were those that appear in Table 1, which treats

25
Moore, supra note 21, at 1549; see also Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent
Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 365 (2000) (concluding that
some significant jury/judge differences do exist in patent litigation); Kimberly A. Moore, Jury
Demands: Who’s Asking? 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 847 (2002) (similar). Her critical views of the
jury, relative to the judge, run counter to most empirical research. See Kevin M. Clermont &
Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 119, 144–47 (2002); see also infra
note 27 and text accompanying note 36.
26

Moore, supra note 21, at 1511.
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those case categories that offer a choice between jury and judge. To
get a number comparable to hers would require multiplying the
foreign-plaintiff-versus-domestic-party loss rate and the domesticparty-versus-foreign-defendant win rate by their frequencies,
summing, and then redividing by total international cases to
produce a single percentage. By this calculation performed on our
data, the domestic parties’ success rate, when appearing as plaintiff
or defendant against a foreigner, in judgments reached by jury trial
would be 48 percent, not the 37 percent that came from all judgments.27 This higher percentage fits with our hypothesis that the
foreigner effect should weaken as the cases approach trial, with the
domestic parties’ success rate rising toward 50 percent, “arguably
because the cases by then are solidly in the hands of American
lawyers and have almost survived the settlement process. Yet misperceptions of bias, especially regarding foreign plaintiffs, seem to
preserve some foreigner effect even at trial.”28 In any event, Professor Moore’s summary could then have said: “Clermont and Eisenberg
find that American parties win [48% of certain alienage jury trials], while
this study finds that American parties win 64% of [patent jury trials in
which their adversaries are foreign].”
3. However, this refinement of her summary still uses a simplified
measure. She did not compare foreign to domestic plaintiffs when
facing a domestic defendant, and then compare foreign to domestic
defendants when facing a domestic plaintiff. She instead tried to
combine these two comparisons into the just-discussed single percentage that compares foreign to domestic litigants. Although her
single measure could sometimes be suggestive, it can also be misleading: it can mislead because it ignores the base rate for wins, a failure
that becomes troublesome if the frequencies of foreigners’ appearances are not equal. For example, if the plaintiff win rates exceed 50
percent and if foreigners appear more often as defendants than as
plaintiffs (both of which have in fact been true), then the single
conflating percentage will overstate the domestic parties’ success rate
(and thus understate the complementary foreigners’ success rate).

27

The comparable number for bench trials in our results would be 44 percent, representing a
statistically insignificant difference from jury trials.
28

Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 1136.
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For an extreme example, if the plaintiff win rate for all types of cases
is 70 percent and if foreigners appear only as defendants, then
Professor Moore’s measure would yield a domestic parties’ success
rate of 70 percent, even though foreigners are actually performing
exactly the same as domestic parties. Thus, her single percentage is
an oversimplification, and her reported results do not permit a direct
comparison with our results. However, some of her results allow
deducing the direction of the oversimplification’s effect. She gave
some win rates for foreign and domestic patentees and infringers,
and she also reported that foreigners are less likely to enforce their
patent rights than Americans.29 Putting those reports together shows
that her 64 percent figure considerably overstates the domestic
parties’ success rate before juries. Although we accept that her
regression showed a foreigners’ disadvantage, it is hard to see how big
that disadvantage is relative to our results. Thus, Professor Moore’s
results likely support a summary no stronger than this: “Clermont and
Eisenberg find that American parties win [slightly fewer alienage jury trials
than their foreign adversaries], while this study finds that American parties
[do somewhat better than their foreign adversaries in patent jury trials].”
In sum, Professor Moore’s claim to have proven the existence of xenophobia in American courts rested solely on a finding that domestic parties do
better than their foreign adversaries in patent jury trials, to some uncalculated
degree. Contrariwise, we had found that foreigners did slightly better than
their domestic adversaries in alienage jury trials more generally. Why is there
that remaining difference in results? We think that the most plausible explanation for her single difference with all our varied results is that patent cases
are unique.30 Indeed, Professor Moore suggested why patent cases would show
this special effect. She posited a “liberation hypothesis,” whereby the jurors’
biases receive freest rein in complex, difficult, and close cases, and she says
that patent cases are among the most factually complex of all civil cases.31 If

29

See Moore, supra note 21, at 1510, 1527.

30

In past work, we have also attributed her atypical jury results, see supra note 25, to the
uniqueness of patent litigation. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 25, at 145 n.136, 148 n.149.
31
See Moore, supra note 21, at 1521–22; see also James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for
Patent Policy from Empirical Research on Patent Litigation, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1, 2 (2005)
(“Patent litigation has been called the sport of kings; it is complex, uncertain, and expensive.”).
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patent cases indeed are unique, her broader conclusions, those that regard
rampant xenophobia or inferior juries in cases beyond patent litigation, are
shaky.
C. Other Work
The most illuminating of other empirical work in this realm is the forthcoming article by three finance professors on the so-called home court advantage.32 Its principal finding, based on methodologies from financial
economics, was that share prices in the home stock market fell significantly
more for foreign corporations sued in U.S. courts than share prices in the
home stock market fell for domestic corporations sued in U.S. courts. This
finding that the news of suit was worse news for foreign defendants than for
domestic defendants is consistent with our theory of a widespread perception of xenophobia in U.S. courts.
However, the authors went on to try to explain their finding in terms of
actual existence of xenophobia. They ended by concluding that “foreign
firms are disadvantaged in U.S. courts.”33
To reach this conclusion, they developed their own database from the
federal judiciary’s Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER)
project. Their database comprised 3,076 antitrust, breach-of-contract,
employment-related, patent infringement, or product liability federal cases
filed against a publicly listed corporation as the first-named defendant
during (seemingly calendar years) 1995–2000. They found no significant
differences in rates of dismissal or settlement. But in the 12 percent of the

32

Utpal Bhattacharya, Neal Galpin & Bruce Haslem, The Home Court Advantage in International Corporate Litigation (forthcoming in J.L. & Econ.), available at <http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=932690> (Aug. 2006). Related realms have seen
plenty of empirical work. For example, David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An
Empirical Study of California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 511 (2003),
was a jury-verdict-reporter study of California state and federal cases based on employment law
during 1998–1999; it found that women and minorities fared peculiarly badly as plaintiffs in
discrimination and wrongful discharge jury trials, as compared to other kinds of plaintiffs and
to other kinds of employment cases. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How
Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 429
(2004).
33

Bhattacharya et al., supra note 32, at 7, 27.
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cases that went to judgment by “trial,”34 the foreign defendants fared significantly worse, with the plaintiff win rate being 19 percent against U.S. corporate defendants and 28 percent against foreign corporate defendants. This
result survived multiple regression and other checks. Interestingly, the
authors further found that “the bias is in judge trials, not jury trials.”35 That
is, they located their effect solely in U.S. corporate defendants doing significantly better by judicial adjudication. “This seemingly contradicts the finding
of Moore (2003), who found prejudice in the jury.”36
In sum, another article has suggested that trial outcomes disfavor
foreigners, to some degree. Again, in our study, we expected to see little
foreigner effect for cases that had made it all the way through the litigation
process to trial, but we did find that foreign defendants did very slightly
better than domestic defendants in diversity and alienage trials. Why that
difference in results? The explanation perhaps lies in sample sizes and time
trends. For a suggestive illustration, our study, which covered the years just
before this new article’s coverage, found that the foreigners’ overall advantage was decreasing with the passing years.

III. New Results
This basic disagreement in the prior research thus poses the question
whether it is xenophobia or xenophilia at work in U.S. courts, or neither.
More precisely phrased, is any existing xenophobia more or less powerful
than litigants expect, given that misperception is all that outcome data can
reveal? Even to answer the latter question, it turns out, requires taking a

34

They define trial as a judicial grant of summary judgment, a bench trial, or a jury trial. Id. at
9–11. These adjudicated cases comprised 381 cases (300 involved a U.S. corporate defendant,
and 81 involved a foreign corporate defendant). Id. at 10 tbl.1.
35

36

Id. at 7.

Id. at 28 (“In fact, U.S. firms in a jury decision and foreign firms in either a judge or jury
decision have statistically indistinguishable win rates.”). However, the authors here seem to have
compared jury trials to all sorts of decisions by judges (now including dismissals too), id., tbl.10,
so their finding of a judge/jury trial difference (at least as the term “trial” is used in standard
legal discourse) may be suspect. It may be that all their data, taken together, point merely to
domestic corporate defendants doing somewhat better on granted summary judgments than
foreign corporate defendants (or it may be only that grants of summary judgment are more
common in domestic litigation), but the authors did not develop any such point.
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longer (and broader) view than the prior empirical research has managed.
So, to investigate this matter, we decided to reexamine our prior results by
including more data, expanding the study through more recent years.
A. Data
We again turn to the available computerized data gathered by the Administrative Office, now going through fiscal year 2005.37 When any civil case
terminates in a federal district court, the court clerk transmits to the Administrative Office a form containing information about the case. The form
includes the parties’ names, the subject matter of the case, its jurisdictional
basis and removal or transfer status, the amount demanded, the dates of
filing and termination, the procedural stage at which the case terminated,
the procedural method of disposition, and, if the court entered a judgment,
who prevailed and the relief granted. The form distinguishes among many
subject matter categories, including branches of contract, tort, and other
areas of law. Since fiscal year 1986, the form also specifies whether the two
principal parties in diversity and alienage cases were American or foreign.38
Thus, the database covers all the millions of federal civil cases over many
years from the whole country. Unfortunately, however, the Administrative
Office data do not contain many other things one would like to know, such
as particulars about the foreign party.
For this article, our database comprises the 171,710 diversity and
alienage cases, ending in judgment for plaintiff or defendant, that allow
calculation and comparison of win rates for domestic and foreign parties.39
To be precise, the win rate is the fraction of plaintiff wins among judgments for either the plaintiff or the defendant. Note that these judgments
comprise much more than trial outcomes. For Administrative Office pur37

For a fuller description of the database, see Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 25, at 127–29.

38
Because there is a lag in implementing new codes, especially in data classified by termination
as opposed to filing, we did not include data for fiscal year 1986. Data after fiscal year 2005 are
not yet available. Thus, we used data for fiscal years 1987–2005.
For fiscal years 1987–1991, the year end was June 30. Consequently, we present some data for
calendar year 1986 (from the first half of fiscal year 1987). Beginning with fiscal year 1992, the
year ended on September 30. Consequently, we present some data for calendar year 2005 (from
the last three-quarters of fiscal year 2005).
39
We excluded 1,388 otherwise includible cases in which the plaintiff or the defendant was a
foreign nation, 445 cases in which both principal parties were coded as aliens, and 7 cases in
which residence data were missing.
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poses, judgments might be the result of adjudication, consent, or default,
but they normally do not include voluntary dismissals or dismissals for lack
of prosecution. For our purposes, however, we narrowed the definition
of judgments to include only those cases where the data indicate a win by
plaintiff or defendant, not by both or by an unknown party.
B. Results
1. Trials: Win Rates and Numbers
Because the recent research has suggested that foreigners fare badly in
federal civil trials, we look first at trial outcomes over the years. Specifically,
we use the Administrative Office’s procedural progress code to study the
fully tried cases. However, we consider only the same case categories that
we studied previously on the differences between jury and judge trial,
which are 12 sizable case categories where litigants have a clear choice
between jury and judge trial.40 It is not the whole universe of cases, but
it is a bigger world than any specific case grouping, such as patent
infringement.
Case-selection theory predicts that any foreigner effect seen in all
judgments will diminish as the court’s docket contracts while approaching
the stage of trial.41 Accordingly, as one can see in Figure 1, there is no clear
story regarding foreigners, whether in jury trials or judge trials. The foreigners’ “advantage” as seen only in trials was never big but, if anything, has
decreased in recent years.
Thus, the recent research seems misguided in building conclusions on
foreigners’ supposedly poor performance at trial. In fact, we could instead
say that at least foreign plaintiffs seem to fare slightly better than domestic
plaintiffs, as Figure 1 suggests over the passing years. But the relatively small
number of trials involving foreigners renders the results volatile. The difficulty in inferring conclusions has indeed intensified in recent years, for
two reasons. First, the number of cases involving foreigners and going to
40

The 12 case categories are Negotiable Instruments; General Contract; Torts to Land; Airplane
Personal Injury; Assault, Libel & Slander; Marine Personal Injury; Motor Vehicle Personal
Injury; Other Personal Injury; Medical Malpractice; Product Liability; General Fraud; and Torts
to Personal Property. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Trial by Jury or
Judge: Which Is Speedier? 70 Judicature 176 (1996) (including FELA as a 13th category, which
does not rest on diversity jurisdiction).
41

See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 25, at 137–42 (discussing this “refraction effect”).
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Trial win rates by year.
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Note: This figure shows, by graphing plaintiff win rate for each year, that foreigners do not
substantially outperform their domestic counterparts in jury trials or judge trials. It gives the
rates in 12 case categories that offer litigants a clear choice between jury and judge: Negotiable
Instruments; General Contract; Torts to Land; Airplane Personal Injury; Assault, Libel &
Slander; Marine Personal Injury; Motor Vehicle Personal Injury; Other Personal Injury; Medical
Malpractice; Product Liability; General Fraud; and Torts to Personal Property.
Source: Administrative Office data for fiscal years 1987–2005.

judgment has dropped sharply.42 Second, the number of trials, and especially
the number of bench trials, has plummeted.43
Table 2 shows a foreigners’ “advantage” in its totals for the whole
period. But if one were to focus on only a few years, one would be apt to jump
to a faulty conclusion. For example, domestic defendants were temporarily
outperforming foreign defendants at trial for much of the time period
42

43

See infra text accompanying notes 49–50.

See Ad Hoc Comm. on the Future of the Civil Trial of the Am. College of Trial Lawyers, The
“Vanishing Trial”: The College, the Profession, the Civil Justice System, 226 F.R.D. 414 (2005);
Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 25, at 142–44; Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An
Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. Empirical Legal
Stud. 459 (2004) (followed by other JELS symposium articles); Symposium, Vanishing Trial,
2006 J. Disp. Resol. 1.

Xenophilia or Xenophobia in U.S. Courts? Before and After 9/11

Table 2:

455

Jury and Judge Trials in 12 Case Categories During FY 1987–2005
Foreign Plaintiffs

All-Domestic Cases

Foreign Defendants

59.76
70.69
574
505

49.32
61.05
17,621
5,962

49.37
55.14
1,910
740

Jury plaintiff win rate
Judge plaintiff win rate
Number of jury trials
Number of judge trials

Note: This table shows, by compiling total numbers for the whole period, that foreigners
generally outperformed their domestic counterparts in jury trials and judge trials. It gives the
plaintiff win rate and the number of fully tried cases in 12 case categories that offer litigants a
clear choice between jury and judge: Negotiable Instruments; General Contract; Torts to Land;
Airplane Personal Injury; Assault, Libel & Slander; Marine Personal Injury; Motor Vehicle
Personal Injury; Other Personal Injury; Medical Malpractice; Product Liability; General Fraud;
and Torts to Personal Property.
Source: Administrative Office data for fiscal years 1987–2005.

studied in the “home court advantage” article, inducing its conclusion of
xenophobia. A lesson for empirical researchers is to be especially sensitive to
sample size, and to be sure to sample a range of years (as well as numerous
case categories) before drawing general conclusions.
2. Judgments: Win Rates
More of the story emerges from an examination of all judgments, rather than
just trials, rendered in all diversity and alienage case categories. However, the
pattern that then appears is varied enough to exclude any simplistic explanation such as xenophobia or xenophilia in U.S. courts. Case selection seems
to be the only explanation possible.
Figure 2 reveals the importance of time trends. Over the last 20 years,
foreigners’ success rates have gone from being significantly stronger than
their domestic counterparts’ (with the foreign plaintiffs’ line above the
middle one, and the foreign defendants’ line below) to being indistinguishable. Indeed, the strong time trend makes suspect any study of short duration, as it might be showing only a passing phenomenon. Any two separate
studies could tell very different stories, and yet be entirely consistent, simply
because they cover different eras.
Our xenophilia article’s key result, for 1986–1994,44 appears as the left
half of Figure 2. Foreigners then were enjoying considerable success, both as
plaintiffs and defendants. However, the dominant long-term time trend,

44

See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 1125 fig.1.
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Domestic and foreign judgment win rates by year.
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Note: This figure shows, by graphing plaintiff win rate for each year, that in the past foreigners
did substantially outperform their domestic counterparts in obtaining favorable judgments, but
that more recently the foreigners’ “advantage” has all but disappeared.
Source: Administrative Office data for fiscal years 1987–2005.

already at play, was just becoming insistent when the plaintiff win rate for
domestic plaintiff versus foreign defendant jumped over the all-domestic
plaintiff win rate in 1994. Foreign defendants were then losing more often
than their domestic counterparts for the first time since these records were
kept. This “jump,” however, resulted more from the diving all-domestic
plaintiff win rate than from an increase in the plaintiff win rate for domestic
plaintiff versus foreign defendant. Still, although foreign defendants may
appear to have been holding their own, they in fact were not enjoying the
difficult-to-explain general decline in plaintiff win rate seen widely in other
types of actions.45 Meanwhile, there was no denying that the foreign plaintiffs’ win rate was taking a serious dive.
In Figure 2’s second decade, the converging lines tended to level out.
Any striking foreigners’ advantage (or disadvantage) had vanished. The
smaller number of foreigner judgments made their lines ever more volatile.
But that volatility made the converged lines even less interesting, at least at
first glance.
45

See infra text accompanying note 51.
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In overall totals, the first decade’s results overwhelm the second
decade’s: foreigners, and especially foreign plaintiffs, have fared significantly
better than their domestic counterparts. The overall plaintiff win rate for
foreign plaintiff against domestic defendant for the whole duration of data
availability has been 74.83 percent, for domestic plaintiff against domestic
defendant 58.66 percent, and for domestic plaintiff against foreign defendant 50.35 percent.46 Multivariate regressions confirm these significant differences (p < 0.0005).
But the convergence over time really remains the big story. Maybe
Figure 3 presents a better way to view the time trend. It shows the foreigner
effect from 1986 to 2005 by graphing the plaintiff win rate in foreign-plaintiffversus-domestic-defendant cases minus the plaintiff win rate in domesticplaintiff-versus-foreign-defendant cases. In other words, it shows the distance
between the top and bottom lines in the prior figure, while it neutralizes the
effect of the diving plaintiff win rate. The bigger that distance, the greater the
success that foreigners are enjoying in judgment outcomes, whether they
appear as plaintiff or defendant. As the distance approaches zero, any foreigner effect is disappearing. Thus, Figure 3 shows the sizable foreigners’
“advantage” dropping to nothing over the last two decades.
What do Figures 2 and 3 really mean? Well, basically, that only a
reflexive sort of case selection—and not some fundamental and enduring
structural or cultural cause—could produce such a changeable pattern. Does
that mean that the two figures have nothing else to say? No, because
conjecture—when combined with our theory that the anticipated xenophobia in U.S. courts and the distaste for litigating away from home produce
foreigners’ aversion to litigating here (and, of course, their domestic opponents’ reciprocal eagerness to litigate here)—can take us further in interpreting the time trends shown in these graphs.
In the 1980s, litigants assumed that xenophobia prevailed, and consequently the outcome data showed foreigners faring well when the courts’

46
The subsidiary observations from the xenophilia article carry over as well to the new data. For
example, over the last two decades, the respective win rates for those three types of actions that
ended by the trial method of disposition are 62.55 percent, 51.26 percent, and 50.50 percent;
by pretrial motion they are 51.84 percent, 32.57 percent, and 26.58 percent; and so this
comparison shows a decreased foreigner effect at trial. The percentage of judgments disposed
of by the trial method of disposition for those three types of actions are, respectively, 16.12
percent, 20.88 percent, and 31.79 percent; by default they are 35.03 percent, 25.09 percent, and
14.84 percent; and so this comparison suggests that foreign plaintiffs and defendants have
strong cases.
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Figure 3: Combined foreign plaintiffs’ and defendants’ success rates by year
(win rate of Foreign P v. Domestic D) – (win rate of Domestic P v. Foreign D).
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Note: This figure shows, by summing for each year the foreign plaintiffs’ advantage and the
foreign defendants’ advantage in obtaining favorable judgments, that in the past foreigners did
outperform their domestic counterparts’ success rates by up to 40 percent, but that more
recently the foreigners’ edge has disappeared or even dropped below 0 percent.
Source: Administrative Office data for fiscal years 1987–2005.

bias proved to be less than expected. But then the Wall came down, and
globalization became the watchword, so that during the 1990s foreign plaintiffs lost some of their reluctance to litigate here, and hence they saw a diving
win rate. Even more quickly, foreign defendants, who are more likely corporate or at least worldly enough to be subject to suit here, had overcome
some of their unwarranted aversion to suit here (and unwarranted willingness to cave in settlement), and so they had seen their success rate become
less advantageous and hence more comparable to that of their domestic
counterparts. In sum, expectations of bias had come to better match existence of bias.
After 9/11, foreign plaintiffs and foreign defendants both did significantly better in terms of success rate, especially after the lag time necessary
for any influence to affect data such as these on the termination of cases.
Foreigners again feared litigating here.47 Foreign would-be plaintiffs and

47

See Peter Geier, The New Bias Hurdle: Middle Eastern Clients, Nat’l L.J., May 29, 2006, at 4.
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defendants abandoned or satisfied most claims, and persisted only in the
cases they were most likely to win. Then, when they encountered less than
the anticipated amount of bias, their success rates rose. But with time and the
return toward normalcy, more standard win rates are now reasserting themselves. Such short-term effects suggest that case selection can be quite effective in driving win rates.
Surely this conjecture sounds a little silly. Our point, however, is merely
that a plausible case-selection story could have produced the pattern
observed. It is this possibility that strengthens our belief that foreigners’
outcomes, coming from a caseload driven by the parties’ perceptions of
xenophobia, show predominantly a case-selection effect. These graphs plot
uncontrolled outcome data and thus exhibit case selection at work, but they
do not and cannot prove the existence of actual xenophobia or xenophilia.
The case-selection explanation becomes even more plausible if we look
beyond this comparison between foreign and domestic litigants. In our
xenophilia article, we saw an analogous effect in domestic diversity cases if we
compared the in-state U.S. plaintiffs’ win rate against U.S. defendants to the
win rate of out-of-state U.S. plaintiffs against U.S. defendants.48 The out-ofstaters’ win rate was significantly higher. Thus, nonlocals did not fare at all
poorly, apparently because they were selective about the cases they chose to
litigate away from home.
Now extending the study to recent years, we see a continuation of that
pattern, as shown by Figure 4. Although these plaintiff win rates exhibit the
typical decline over the recent decades, the top line representing out-of-state
plaintiffs has stayed consistently above the bottom line for in-state plaintiffs.
The lines do not exhibit the convergence or the bumps that we saw in
Figure 2 for foreigners’ success rates. In other words, the forces affecting
case selection by foreigners seemingly differ from those affecting case selection by Americans. Case selection turns on particularistic forces, and they
can change rather quickly with time.
3. Judgments: Numbers
Thus, all seems to be starting to make sense—until one looks at the number of
judgments. Over the last 20 years, there has been a considerable drop in the
number of diversity and alienage judgments. Table 3 gives the numbers of
judgments by year. The drop for wholly domestic diversity cases is impressive,
48

See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 1142–43.
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In-state and out-of-state diversity parties’ win rates by year.
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Note: This figure shows, by graphing plaintiff win rate for each year in all-domestic diversity
cases, that nonlocal plaintiffs have substantially and consistently outperformed local plaintiffs in
winning favorable judgments. Apparently because nonlocals are selective about the cases they
choose to litigate away from home, they enjoy elevated win rates.
Source: Administrative Office data for fiscal years 1987–2005.

but the alienage decrease is steadier and greater. For these sets of cases, the
system is experiencing the vanishing judgment, similar to the more widely felt
vanishing trial.
To get an inkling of the cause of the dropping numbers, it is necessary
to note that Table 3 presents only judgments, not overall caseload. Table 4
shows the numbers of terminations by year. Terminations comprise not just
judgments for plaintiff or defendant, but all federal cases ending in any
manner, including all settlements. It seems that domestic diversity terminations, as opposed to judgments, have not decreased.49 But the drop in
alienage terminations at least helps explain why alienage judgments are
49

The drop for domestic diversity judgments might relate in part to such legal changes as the
increase in the jurisdictional amount for cases commenced or removed after 1988, again given
that it takes some time for any such change to show up in termination data. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 201, 102 Stat. 4642, 4646 (1988)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006)); see David A. Greher, Note, The Application of 28
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) to Alien Corporations: A Dual Citizenship Analysis, 36 Va. J. Int’l L. 233, 241
n.38 (1995). But the lack of a drop in domestic diversity terminations argues against this
explanation.
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Table 3: Number of Diversity and Alienage
Judgments by Year
Calendar
Year
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Total

Foreign
Plaintiffs

All-Domestic
Cases

Foreign
Defendants

2,592
2,012
1,002
658
440
341
334
297
236
284
257
269
240
211
211
220
177
171
155
113
10,220

8,552
9,803
11,642
11,854
10,097
8,934
8,985
8,155
7,274
7,287
7,415
7,169
6,698
6,909
6,778
6,594
7,468
6,502
5,187
4,157
157,460

2,896
2,393
1,395
936
614
511
366
344
336
319
282
300
282
239
196
183
165
161
118
108
12,144

Note: This table shows the dramatically decreasing number of
diversity and alienage judgments over the last two decades. For
fiscal years 1987–1991, the year end was June 30. Consequently,
we have some data for calendar year 1986 (from the first half of
fiscal year 1987). Beginning with fiscal year 1992, the year ended
on September 30. Consequently, we have some data for calendar
year 2005 (from the last three-quarters of fiscal year 2005). We
calculated the above numbers for calendar years 1986 and 2005
by extrapolation from the stub years that fiscal year data yield.
Source: Administrative Office data for fiscal years 1987–2005.

dropping faster than diversity judgments.50 Both diversity and alienage cases
are experiencing a sharp drop in judgment rate, or the number of judgments divided by the number of terminations. Looking at other bases of
jurisdiction, we can see these decreases in judgments are biggest in diversity
and alienage jurisdiction.
50

Legal changes might have some effect here, too, such as the 1988 statute’s classifying permanent resident aliens as state citizens and hence decreasing the role for alienage jurisdiction.
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 203, 102 Stat. 4642, 4646
(1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006)). But note that the drop in terminations
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Table 4: Number of Diversity and Alienage
Terminations by Year
Calendar
Year
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Total

Foreign
Plaintiffs

All-Domestic
Cases

Foreign
Defendants

7,122
5,557
3,444
2,346
1,713
1,502
1,510
1,275
1,243
1,179
1,199
1,333
1,307
1,240
1,956
1,526
1,249
1,249
1,073
1,101
40,124

36,504
44,905
52,422
52,897
50,927
59,693
48,268
50,787
44,990
42,663
46,297
50,265
58,568
56,265
46,031
47,110
51,619
51,992
60,531
52,843
1,005,577

17,080
13,380
9,273
5,746
4,661
6,737
2,864
2,111
2,482
2,049
1,909
1,964
1,771
1,485
1,274
1,458
1,085
1,026
965
875
80,195

Note: This table shows the number of diversity and alienage
terminations over the last two decades, as the alienage terminations plummeted. For fiscal years 1987–1991, the year end
was June 30. Consequently, we have some data for calendar year
1986 (from the first half of fiscal year 1987). Beginning with
fiscal year 1992, the year ended on September 30. Consequently, we have some data for calendar year 2005 (from the
last three-quarters of fiscal year 2005). We calculated the above
numbers for calendar years 1986 and 2005 by extrapolation
from the stub years that fiscal year data yield.
Source: Administrative Office data for fiscal years 1987–2005.

The overall downward time trends in the number and rate of diversity
and alienage judgments are so dramatically strong as to mask any smaller
short-term effects. Yet those big time trends remain difficult to explain. A
drop in the judgment rate suggests an increase in settlements not embodied
in a judgment. Consistently with that suggestion, and especially in diversity
involving foreign litigants could extend well beyond alienage cases, given that the Administrative Office has chosen to code foreign citizenship only for that jurisdictional basis and so may be
hiding a drop in foreigners litigating on other jurisdictional bases.
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Domestic and foreign judgment rates by year.

Note: This figure graphs for each year the judgment rate, or the number of judgments divided
by the number of terminations. It shows that foreign plaintiffs’ suits in the past went all the way
to judgment much more often than did domestic plaintiffs’ suits and especially those suits
against foreign defendants, but that more recently these differences have all but disappeared.
Our thanks go to Professor Kuo-Chang Huang for suggesting this figure.
Source: Administrative Office data for fiscal years 1987–2005.

and alienage cases, the number of default and consent judgments have
dropped during the recent years while other dismissals have gone up.51
We can combine Tables 3 and 4 into Figure 5 to show the judgment
rates. Interestingly, Figure 5 closely resembles the pattern of plaintiff win rates
in Figure 2, so that in pattern, over the years studied, the judgment rates have
replicated the plaintiff win rates. Perhaps, then, the judgment rate and the
plaintiff win rate are related in such a way that the former explains the latter’s
downward trend. That is, as the years passed, domestic defendants may have
come to be more adverse to litigation and hence to settle more of the strong
cases against them, whether brought by foreign or domestic plaintiffs, and
51
But the number of other types of dispositions, such as remand and transfer, have gone way up
over the same period of time. Switching focus from the Administrative Office’s code for method
of disposition to its code for procedural progress, one observes a big increase in early terminations that come after some court action, and a decrease in those that come with no court action.
Thus, one cannot say that an increase in settlement rate is at work alone. See Gillian K. Hadfield,
Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in
the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 705 (2004).
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thus lowered the plaintiff win rates. This change has especially impacted the
foreign plaintiffs. Unlike foreign defendants, foreign plaintiffs can demonstrate their aversion to suit in this country by staying out of court. Consequently, in the early years there were fewer foreign plaintiff suits than foreign
defendant suits, but the domestic defendants’ reluctance to settle forced the
foreign plaintiffs to go to judgment in their strong cases at a much higher rate
than other plaintiffs and so produced an elevated foreign plaintiff win rate.
However, in the more recent years, as the perceptions of xenophobia and the
domestic defendants’ resistance to settlement decreased, all these foreigner
effects diminished.
Whatever the explanation, the drops in the numbers of alienage terminations and judgments do not necessarily imply an increasing aversion by
foreigners. Other forces could be dictating the drops, even while the foreigners’ exaggerated fear of bias could in fact be decreasing. The relatively
fewer cases that do not settle would be the ones that the parties see as close
cases. If the foreigners encounter only the expected level of bias in those
cases that go to judgment, they would see depressed rates of success.
Still, the dropping numbers make our story of changes in the foreigners’ aversion harder to believe. One might therefore choose to argue instead
that xenophobia took a grip on the nation in the five-year period after 1986,
causing foreigners’ terminations, judgments, and success rates to drop like
so many rocks and then stay at the bottom. But is that even plausible? Is it not
much more likely that forces other than xenophobia were driving case
selection—and that therefore researchers should be even more wary of
drawing general conclusions about the neutrality of our legal system based
on the obviously skewed samples of foreigners’ terminations and judgments?

IV. Conclusion
The available data, when considered in a big enough sample from numerous
case categories and a range of years, indicate that foreigners do not fare
poorly in the federal courts—indeed, they have outperformed their domestic counterparts. Thus, the data offer no support for the existence of xenophobic bias in U.S. courts.
What the data do show is that case selection drives the outcomes for
foreigners. Foreigners’ aversion to a U.S. forum, an aversion that waxes and
wanes over the years, can elevate the foreigners’ success rates. Consequently,
researchers should be wary of drawing structural or cultural explanations
from the changeable pattern of outcome data.

